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Jack Korman and Robert Likas were subpoenaed to appear before
the grand jury which was investigating illegal activities prohibited by
the Organized Crime Control Act.' They declined to answer questions,
2
relying on their fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
After being given use immunity,3 they reappeared before the grand jury,
but once more they refused to answer the questions asked them. The
4
government entered a motion for an order to hold them in contempt.
At a hearing on the contempt charge, they contended that the statutory
immunity from the use of their testimony in a criminal case was unconstitutional. The district court granted the government's motion, and
held both witnesses in contempt, from which judgment they appealed.5
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit in In re Korman6 reversed the con1 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1511, 1952, 1955 (1970).
2 In re Korman, 449 F.2d 32, 34 (7th Cir. 1971).
3 The Organized Crime Control Act § 201(a), 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970) provides:

Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against selfincrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or
ancillary to(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either House of Congress, a joint committee of the two Houses, or a committee or a subcommittee of either House, and the person presiding over
the proceeding communicates to the witness an order issued under this
part, the witness may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis
of his privilege against self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or
indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used
against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury,
giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.
4 The Organized Crime Control Act § 301(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1970) in pertinent
part provides:
(a) Whenever a witness in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court
or grand jury of the United States refuses without just cause shown to comply
with an order of the court to testify or provide other information, including any
book, paper, document, record, recording or other material, the court, upon such
refusal, or when such refusal is duly brought to its attention, may summarily
order his confinement at a suitable place until such time as the witness is willing
to give such testimony or provide such information. No period of such confinement shall exceed the life of(1) the court proceeding, or
(2) the term of the grand jury, including extensions, before which such
refusal to comply with the court order occurred, but in no event shall
such confinement exceed eighteen months.
5 449 F.2d at 33-34.
6 449 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1971).
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tempt order on the ground that appellants' privilege against self-incrimi7
nation could not be constitutionally supplanted by use immunity.
The court held that use immunity does not fulfill the "minimal constitutional guarantees" required for immunity statutes, since it leaves
the witnesses subject to future prosecution grounded on matters related
to their compelled testimony.8 It was held that only transactional immunity can completely protect the witness against future prosecution
in the jurisdiction which compelled the testimony.9
In Stewart v. United States,'0 the Ninth Circuit, construing the
same immunity statute, held it constitutional since it proscribed the use
of the compelled testimony and any other information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony."
The origin of the privilege against self-incrimination lies in the
oath ex officio, 1 2 established in 1236 by the ecclesiastical courts of Eng-

land. The oath traveled a difficult course, caught between the Church's
desire to conduct unabridged inquiries into the behavior and morals
of those in the diocese and the sovereign's wish to forbid Church officials
from compelling persons to give testimony which might defame them.
By the middle of the 18th Century, this strife culminated in the English judiciary giving effect to an individual's privilege not to incrimi3
nate himself.1
The result of these developments was firmly established in the
American colonies by 1789.14 Six colonies incorporated self-incrimina7 Id. at 35.

8 Id.
9 Id. at 39.
10 440 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1971).
11 Id. at 957. Michael Stewart and Charles Kastigar were subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury. When they refused to testify concerning alleged violations of federal
law, they were granted use immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970), but remained
silent. They appealed from the district court's order of contempt and imprisonment.
The order was affirmed and they appealed to the United States Supreme Court where
certiorari was granted sub nor. Kastigar v. United States, 402 U.S. 971 (1971).
12 The oath required a person to answer all questions put to him by church officials
without presentment or accusation. Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34
MINN. L. Rav. 1 (1949). For an interesting discussion of the historical evolution of the
oath, see Silving, The Oath: I, 68 YALE L.J. 1329 (1959). See also 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2250 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
13 For interesting and informative reading on the history of the oath ex officio in
England, see Morgan, supra note 12, at 1-18.
14 Id. at 22. For a more detailed discussion of the development of the privilege
in the United States, see Pittman, Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763 (1935). See also Pittman, The
Fifth Amendment: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 42 A.B.A.J. 509 (1956). See generally
Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MICH.
L. REV. 191 (1930).
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tion provisions into their laws.1 5 The inequities resulting from the denial of a person's right not to incriminate himself motivated the colonists to write a constitutional amendment which states that "No person
...shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... 16 Thus, the "maxim, [nemo tenetur seipsum accusare (no one
is bound to accuse himself)]' 7 which in England was a mere rule of
evidence, became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a
constitutional enactment.""' With the passage of time, and the progressive development of the United States, many immunity statutes were
enacted which specifically defined the type of immunity that was sufficient to compel the witness to testify against himself.' 9 These statutes
can be separated into two types-use or testimonial immunity, and
2
transactional or absolute immunity. 0
The use immunity statutes prevent the utilization of the compelled testimony and its direct or indirect fruits in a subsequent prosecution, but allow the government to utilize evidence obtained from an
independent, legitimate and untainted source to prosecute the witness.2 1 Transactional immunity, in addition to granting use protection,
also prohibits subsequent prosecution for any transaction to which the
15 Morgan, supra note 12, at 22. These colonies were Virginia, Pennsylvania, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, Vermont and Massachusetts. See 1 B. POORE, UNITED STATES
CHARTERS AND CONSTITUTIONS, 956; 2 B. POOE, supra, at 1294, 1409, 1541-42, 1860, 1909
(2d ed. 1878).
16 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
17 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1191 (4th ed. 1968); see Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172, 181
(1871).
18 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597 (1896).
19 For a list of federal and state immunity statutes, see 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2281 n.ll (McNaughton rev. 1961, Supp. 1971).
For a discussion of some of the problems encountered in determining when to grant
immunity, see Note, Federal Immunity Statutes: Problems and Proposals, 37 CEO. WASH.
L. REv. 1276 (1969).
The test to be followed in order to determine when immunity should be given
is very aptly stated in Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951):
The privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in themselves
support a conviction . . . but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link
in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant . . . . To sustain the
privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the
setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious
disclosure could result.
20 The protection of these statutes can be acquired "automatically" while under
oath and in response to a subpoena, by "claim" while under oath and in response to
a subpoena and by "claim" of the fifth amendment privilege without the oath or the
subpoena. See Note, supra note 19, at 1277, 1290-92 for the federal immunity statutes
listed under the three above categories. See also McKay, Self-lncrimination and the New
Privacy, 1967 Sup. CT. REy. 193, 228-32 (1967).
21 J. WicMORE, supra note 19, § 2281 n.11.
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compelled testimony related, regardless of whether or not the evidence
22
is independent, legitimate and untainted.
The practice of granting immunity has become an increasingly
effective weapon in the fight against crime. 23 Therefore, the constitutionality of section 6002 of the Organized Crime Control Act, a general
immunity provision which can be invoked even though there is no
violation of the Act itself, is of vital importance. The Act repealed or
conformed more than fifty existing federal immunity statutes.2 4 Congress, in enacting this statute, decided that the Constitution did not
require that the witness be given transactional immunity and, in fact,
believed that the Supreme Court had acknowledged the adequacy of use
immunity. 25 The reasoning behind this Congressional choice can be
traced to the disparate conclusions of the two Supreme Court decisions
of Counselman v. Hitchcock26 and Murphy v. Waterfront Commission. 2 7 Any discussion of the current status of the law in the area of
immunity must necessarily revolve around these two cases.
Counselman, a landmark case in the area of the constitutional
sufficiency of immunity statutes, involved a grand jury witness who
refused to answer questions for fear that he might incriminate himself.
Upon his repeated refusal to answer, a federal district court adjudged
28
him in contempt, fined and imprisoned him until he should answer.
22 Id. Immunity is a matter of claim in most instances and thus the person has the
right to waive his right to immunity and to testify voluntarily if he has been previously
informed of his rights. Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Commissioner of Sanitation,
392 U.S. 280 (1968) (public employees required to sign waiver of immunity); C. MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE § 130, at 272-74 (1954); Note, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The
Doctrine of Waiver, 61 YALE L.J. 105 (1952).
23 In recent years, our experience in prosecuting organized crime has indicated
that virtually the only means of obtaining incriminating evidence against the
underworld leaders is through the testimony of minor participants who have
valuable knowledge of the syndicate's operations.
SENATE COMMITrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, PERMITTING THE COMPELLING OF TESTIMONY AND THE
REP. No. 308, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 17-18 (1967). See generally Note, Required Information and the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 681 (1965).
24 In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 407, 410-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
25 H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1970):
It [§ 6002] is designed to reflect the use-restriction immunity concept of Murphy
...rather than the transactional immunity concept of Counselman ....
See In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. at 411-12, where section 6002 was declared unconstitutional.
The New Jersey Model State Witness Immunity Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:9M-17
(1970), was changed from a transactional to a use immunity statute in 1968. See In re
Addonizio, 53 N.J. 107, 114-15, 248 A.2d 531, 535-36 (1968).
26 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
27 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
28 In re Counselman, 44 F. 268, 269 (7th Cir. 1890).
GRANTING OF IMMUNITY WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN CRIMEs, S.
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On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed 29 on the ground
that the immunity statute 0 was unconstitutional since it allowed for
the use of the fruits of the compelled testimony. 81 The Court reasoned
that the statute abridged the witness' constitutional privilege by placing him in a worse position than he would have been in had he refused
to answer. The opinion indicated the type of immunity required to
replace the constitutional privilege:
In view of the constitutional provision, a statutory enactment, to
be valid, must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution
for the offense to which the question relates.32
The Counselman requirement of "absolute immunity" was qualified by later decisions which permitted the questioning jurisdiction to
compel testimony in exchange for a grant of immunity, even though
this testimony could be used in prosecuting the witness in another jurisdiction. 33 In 1964, the Court, in deciding Murphy took a step back
in the direction of "absolute immunity." The appellant, although
granted full transactional immunity by the State of New Jersey, refused
142 U.S. at 586.
3o Act of Feb. 25, 1868, ch. 13, § 1, 15 Stat. 37 provides that:
[N]o answer or other pleading of a party, and no discovery, or evidence obtained
by means of any judicial proceeding from any party or witness in this or any
foreign country, shall be given in evidence, or in any manner used against such
party or witness, or his property or estate, in any court of the United States, or
in any proceeding by or before any officer of the United States, in respect to any
crime, or for the enforcement of any penalty or forfeiture by reason of any act
or omission of such party or witness: Provided, That nothing in this act shall be
construed to exempt any party or witness from prosecution and punishment for
perjury committed by him in discovering or testifying as aforesaid.
31 142 U.S. at 585-86:
Section 860, moreover, affords no protection against that use of compelled testimony which consists in gaining therefrom a knowledge of the details of a crime,
and of sources of information which may supply other means of convicting the
witness or party.
Id. at 586.
32 Id. at 586. The statute condemned by Counselman was subsequently amended so
as to conform with the reasoning of the Court. The revised statute reappeared before the
Supreme Court four years later in the case of Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
Although the majority found the use immunity statute coextensive with the constitutional privilege, four dissenting Justices considered transactional immunity the minimal
constitutional requirement. 161 U.S. at 610-38.
In the span of time between the Counselman decision and 1970, Congress wrote
more than fifty immunity provisions into various federal statutes and "with one minor
and unexplained exception in 1898 and two exceptions in 1970, [including 18 U.S.C.
§ 6002 (1970)] every provision has provided for transactional immunity" (footnotes omitted). Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 571 n.ll (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
33 Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944),
overruled, Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79-80 (1964); United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
29
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to testify because he was not protected against the use of his testimony
by the federal authorities. 34 The Court concluded that the federal government could prosecute the appellant but, in doing so, could not use
the compelled testimony or its fruits.3 5 The effect of this decision was
to create an inter-jurisdictional use restriction on all compelled testimony. The Court, by not specifically stipulating the type of immunity
required of the questioning jurisdiction, apparently left intact, on the
intra-jurisdictional level, the Counselman requirement of "absolute
immunity." 6 Therefore, the result of Murphy was the development of
a schism between inter- and intra-jurisdictional immunity.
The Counselman Court was confronted with the constitutionality
of an incomplete use immunity statute, 37 and for that reason, it has
been argued that the decision only provides binding precedent for the
limited proposition that an incomplete use immunity statute is constitutionally defective because it does not protect against the indirect
use of the compelled testimony. 38 Under this interpretation, Counselman's absolute immunity language would be mere dictum. This apparently was the construction accepted in Stewart, since the court
stated therein:
No case has been cited in which the Supreme Court has held
that only a transaction statute will suffice .. .39
Korman, on the other hand, rejected such a limited interpretation of
Counselman and construed the absolute immunity language as the
very basis of the Court's decision. 40 The Counselman Court's criticism
of the statute's inability to protect the witness against the subsequent
use of the "fruits" of his testimony was characterized by Korman as "at
most... an alternative ground for the Court's holding which does not
detract from the force of the ground more specifically relied on," that
34 Application of Waterfront Comm'n, 39 N.J. 436, 440-43, 189 A.2d 36, 39-40 (1963).
35 378 U.S. at 79.
36 For similar reasoning, see Sobel, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination "Federalized," 31 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 46 (1964).
37 142 U.S. at 586. The Act of Feb. 25, 1868, ch. 13, § 1, 15 Stat. 37, provided no
protection against the "use" of the compelled testimony in order to gain other information which could be employed to convict the testifying witness. Id.
38 United States ex rel. Catena v. Elias, 449 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1971). In his dissenting
opinion, Judge Van Dusen stated that:
The majority rejects the conclusions that the Court followed the traditional
practice of deciding constitutional cases on the narrowest possible ground ....
Id. at 47. This was also the government's argument in In re Korman, 449 F.2d at 35 and
In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. at 412.
39 440 F.2d at 956.
40 449 F.2d at 35.
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is, absolute immunity as a constitutional prerequisite. 41 The Third
Circuit recently expressed a similar viewpoint:
[T]hough a narrower ruling might have been made, the [Counselman] Court used this case as a vehicle for deciding that nothing
less than full transactional immunity . . . would suffice. That
decision cannot properly be disregarded as inconsequential dictum .... 42

In Brown v. Walker,43 decided just four years after Counselman,
the Court, in a 5-4 decision, held a transactional immunity statute constitutionally sufficient to supplant the fifth amendment privilege of
silence. The four dissenters argued that even the protection afforded
by transactional immunity was not coextensive with the fifth amendment guarantee. 44 Korman, in an attempt to substantiate its interpretation of Counselman, pointed out that of these four dissenters, two were
members of the unanimous Counselman Court. 45 District Judge Motley,
in the case of In re Kinoy,46 stated that:

If the "absolute immunity" from prosecution language in
Counselman was mere dictum, it took on new life in Brown v.
47
Walker ...as settled doctrine.
In the intervening years between Brown and Murphy, the Supreme
Court reiterated the necessity of transactional immunity.48 However,
41 id.
42 449
43 161
44 Id.
45 449

F.2d at 42.
U.S. 591 (1896).
at 610-38; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35 (1886).
F.2d at 36 n.7.
46 326 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
47 Id. at 414 (footnote omitted).
48 The Supreme Court once again invoked Counselman in Reina v. United States,
364 U.S. 507 (1960) (federal grant of transactional immunity protecting against both
state and federal prosecution held coextensive with the constitutional privilege); Ullmann
v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956) (state transactional immunity statute upheld); Adams
v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954) (failure to claim privilege did not deprive him of the
statutory protection); Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949) (where witness' testimony was not wholly exculpatory, federal transaction immunity will be granted); United
States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943) (automatic grant of transactional immunity under
Sherman Act without claim of privilege against self-incrimination); United States v.
Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931) (the privilege must be claimed when the information is
sought and refused); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924) (full disclosure under
bankruptcy laws not warranted unless Congress grants "full" as opposed to use immunity); Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372 (1905) (state transactional immunity statute upheld even though it does not protect against federal prosecution). See Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43 (1906), where the Court stated that if the statute of limitations for the
offense had run or the act was one for which he had already received immunity or
a pardon then the fifth amendment ceased to apply because there was no "present
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the continued vitality of this requirement became suspect after the
Murphy Court decided that inter-jurisdictional use immunity was
constitutionally sufficient. The Ninth Circuit, in Stewart, not only
declined to interpret Counselman as mandating transactional immunity, but construed Murphy as definitively resolving the question in
favor of use immunity.49 Korman, on the other hand, did not interpret
Murphy as overruling or undermining Counselman,50 and placed considerable reliance upon the case of Albertson v. Subversive Activities
52
Control Board,51 in reaching this determination.
The Albertson case is of particular importance since it involved
a statute providing only a limited use immunity. The Court adjudged
the statute to be unconstitutional on the basis of the Counselman
standard, and stated that
no [immunity] .. . which leaves the party or witness subject to prose-

cution after he answers the criminating question put to him, can
53
have the effect of supplanting the [fifth amendment] privilege ....
The Court's reliance on the "absolute" immunity language, rather
than the narrower prohibition against use of the fruits of the coerced
testimony has been interpreted as repudiating the position that Murphy
had overruled the broad requirement of Counselman:
Those who claim that the transactional immunity requirement
in the Counselman situation has been sub silentio overruled by
Murphy, or other subsequent cases, must explain away the Court's
danger of prosecution." Id. at 66-67. The Court's reasoning would certainly indicate
that only transactional immunity would be coextensive with the fifth amendment protection, since use immunity would not be equivalent to the protection afforded by the
running of the statute of limitations or a pardon. See also Piccirillo v. New York, 400
U.S. 548, 563 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
49 No case has been cited in which the Supreme Court has held that only a transaction statute will suffice, and we have found none. On the contrary, it appears
that Murphy ... has decided the issue ....
440 F.2d at 956.
50 449 F.2d at 39.
Since the Supreme Court has assumed that Counselman was not overruled by
Murphy, we are unwilling to anticipate the Supreme Court and rule that the
Murphy opinion had that effect.
Id.; Mansfield, The Albertson Case: Conflict Between the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Government's Need for Information, 1966 Sup. CT. Rav. 103, 164 (1966):
Murphy did not hold that it would satisfy the privilege if the jurisdictiod demanding incriminating information only gave assurance that it would not make
prosecutory use of the information, and did not give immunity from prosecution
for the matters disclosed.
51 382 U.S. 70 (1965). The Korman court also relied on the case of Stevens v. Marks,
383 U.S. 234 (1966).
52 449 F.2d at 39.
53 582 US. at 80 (quoting from Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 US. at 585).
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. which precisely presented the Counsel-

The debate concerning the impact of Murphy on Counselman
basically consists of two opposing arguments. Some maintain that the
Murphy Court found use immunity to be sufficient between jurisdictions, and it therefore must be equally sufficient when applied intrajurisdictionally, because on either level, the immunity must be coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege. 55 The opposing position
adopts the view that the fifth amendment need not be the same on both
levels of threatened prosecution due to:
(a) Considerations of federalism: The possible repercussion of a
grant of transactional immunity between jurisdictions would be to
deprive a state of the right to prosecute a violation of its criminal
law on the basis of another state's grant of immunity [which] would
be gravely in derogation of its sovereignty and obstructive of its
administration of justice.56
(b) The threat of future prosecution is being diminished on the
dual jurisdictional level:
This danger, substantial when a single jurisdiction both compels
incriminating testimony and brings a later prosecution, may fade
when the jurisdiction bringing the prosecution differs from the
jurisdiction that compelled the testimony. Concern over informal
and undetected exchange of information is also correspondingly less
57
when two different jurisdictions are involved.
54 In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. at 419. The Kinoy court further stated:
[T]hat Counselman is still the law, that it has not been sub silentio overruled
or eroded by more recent opinions, [and] that transactional immunity is constitutionally required as between the questioning sovereign and the witness ....
Id. at 412; United States v. McDaniel, 10 Crim. L. Rep. (8th Cir. Oct. 14, 1971) (court
viewed Counselman as requiring that the questioning jurisdiction grant transactional immunity).
55 In re Zicarelli, 55 N.J. 249, 261 A.2d 129 (1970), prob. juris. noted, 401 U.S. 933
(1971). The court stated unequivocally that the Murphy Court:
[A]greed that the [state immunity] statute should be upheld, but upon the ground
that the witness would indeed be protected in a federal prosecution by virtue of
the Fifth Amendment itself. This conclusion had to reject the thesis that the
Fifth Amendment required an immunity from prosecution rather than an immunity from the use of the coerced testimony.
Id. at 268, 261 A.2d at 139; United States ex rel. Catena v. Elias, 449 F.2d at 49.
56 449 F.2d at 44; In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. at 416.
57 Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 568 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (upheld
the New York transactional immunity statute as necessary in order to replace the
privilege against self-incrimination); United States ex rel. Catena v. Elias, 449 F.2d at 43.
Surely if the Supreme Court had intended to overrule Counselman, it could have
manifested that intent in a much clearer and more direct manner. It appears more likely
that Korman was correct in viewing Murphy as an extension of the fifth amendment
guarantee, 449 F.2d at 37-38.
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Even if we assume that Counselman is no longer binding on the
courts, it is settled that before the privilege can be constitutionally
supplanted, the government must furnish the witness with an adequate
substitute, namely, a replacement which is coextensive with the original
protection.5" In adopting this premise and assuming the nonexistence
of precedent, the Korman court commented:
Even if we regarded this an open question, we believe that the
language of the fifth amendment requires that any jurisdiction
which seeks to compel a witness to testify grant full transactional
immunity and that Congress is powerless under the Constitution
to detract from that requirement by legislation.5 9
The absolute immunity adherents present various arguments to
refute the contention that use immunity is coextensive with the fifth
amendment guarantee. They maintain that although the witness is
protected from the use of his compelled testimony, there is still the
possibility of future prosecution. Even though in such circumstances
the government would have the burden of proving that the evidence
presented in the subsequent prosecution is completely independent
from the compelled testimony, 60 this is a vacuous safeguard when considering: (1) the government's ostensible credibility; (2) the government's vast investigatory resources; 61 (3) the Murphy Court's failure
to stipulate or characterize the government's burden of proof; 62 and
(4) the uncertainties of the fact-finding process which make it arduous
to establish that a succeeding prosecution was derived in some manner
63
from the coerced testimony.
58 449 F.2d at

39-40.

59 Id. (footnote omitted).
60 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 n.18
Once a defendant demonstrates that he has testified,
immunity, to matters related to the federal prosecution,
have the burden of showing that their evidence is not
that they had an independent, legitimate source for the

(1964).
under a state grant of
the federal authorities
tainted by establishing
disputed evidence.

Id.
61 In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. at
To say that a witness can
its source is untainted is to be
the resources of Government as
criminal case.

419,
successfully rebut the Government's proof that
naive about the imbalance which daily attends
opposed to those of the average defendant in a

Id.

62 378 U.S. at 79 n.18.
63 Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 567-68 (1971).
[T]he uncertainties of the factfinding process argue strongly against "use" immunity and in favor of transactional immunity.
Id. at 567.
The witness may be aided in the event of future prosecution by an immunity provision requiring the grant to be recorded. Note, supra note 19, at 1281-82. See Hearing
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Another argument in opposition to use immunity concerns the
chilling effect it may have on a witness in a later prosecution. Because
of an awareness of his prior incriminating testimony, the witness may
be reluctant to take the witness stand in his own defense. He might
fear that:
The prosecutor [would] . . . tailor his questions, consciously or

otherwise, on the basis of his knowledge of the defendant's prior
testimony and [he could] do so without any overt reference to
the testimony given under immunity. 64
In light of these inequities, the argument that a witness receives
adequate protection through a grant of use immunity loses its validity.
The fifth amendment privilege, by giving the witness the right to
remain silent, affords absolute protection from both of the weaknesses
inherent in use immunity. Since there is no compelled testimony in
existence, the witness can neither be prosecuted nor suffer a chilling
effect because of such testimony.6 5
It has been argued that transactional immunity is not constitutionally required since it exceeds the protection afforded by the fifth
amendment guarantee.6 6 This argument can best be illustrated by the
following hypothetical. John Smith, a criminal suspect, was being investigated on the local law enforcement level. Evidence obtained as a
result of that investigation was sufficient to convict him of various
criminal activities. Local authorities decided not to make an immediate arrest and one week later, on the state level, Mr. Smith was called
to testify in the course of a grand jury investigation. There was absolutely no exchange of information between the local authorities and
the grand jury regarding Mr. Smith's criminal activities. The grand
jury was completely unaware of the incriminating evidence obtained
on the local level. As a witness, Mr. Smith refused to testify-exercising
his fifth amendment privilege. He was granted transactional immunity,
testified, and in the course of his testimony, mentioned the crimes of
which the local authorities had sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction. Under his grant of transactional immunity, he can no longer be
prosecuted for those crimes. Had he not been given transactional immunity and been allowed to assert his constitutional privilege, Smith
on Organized Crime and Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Before the Subcommittee on Investigation of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at
338-41 (1963). See generally Gutterman, The Informer Privilege, 58 J. CRIM L. 32 (1967).
64 449 F.2d at 45 (Seitz, C. J., concurring).
65 400 U.S. at 568-69.
66 449 F.2d at 49 (Van Dusen, J., dissenting); In re Zicarelli, 55 N.J. 249, 267, 261 A.2d
129, 138 (1970). See Murphy v. Counselman, 378 U.S. at 107 (White, J., concurring).
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would have been subsequently prosecuted and convicted on the basis
of the previously discovered evidence.
Under this hypothetical transactional immunity exceeds the protection afforded by the fifth amendment. Under a grant of use immunity, however, the result would have been the same as if he had remained silent. The conclusion to be reached is that transactional
immunity is exceedingly broad, while use immunity is coextensive with
the fifth amendment's protection. Basically, this argument illustrates
that transactional immunity exceeds the fifth amendment privilege,
since it protects a witness from prosecution on the basis of completely
independent evidence-evidence having absolutely no connection with
the witness' compelled testimony. This argument is also, necessarily,
an endorsement of use immunity, since the seemingly unjust result is
avoided by a grant of use protection.
The premise of the preceding argument is that the fifth amendment protects a witness against only self-incrimination and not every
incrimination. Therefore, a witness could be compelled to testify if
protected against the use of his testimony or its "fruits." At first glance,
this argument appears quite valid, but closer inspection reveals its
defect-a theoretical foundation. The argument ignores the practicalities involved in criminal prosecutions.6 7 As previously illustrated the
government's burden of proof, with respect to establishing the independence of its evidence, is insufficient protection. Ultimately, the
witness who has been compelled to forsake his constitutional privilege
might be faced with the difficult task of refuting the government's
assertion that their evidence is completely independent from his coerced testimony. 68 The nebulous nature of the connective link is the
crux of the immunity controversy, and this link becomes even more
difficult to establish in the absence of bad faith on the part of the government.
[T] his argument does not depend upon assumptions of misconduct
or collusion among government officers. It assumes only the nor67 400 U.S. at 568 (Brennan, J., dissenting); United States ex rel. Catena v. Elias,
449 F.2d 40, 43-44 (3d Cir. 1971).
68 After Murphy placed the burden of proof on the government in all subsequent
prosecutions, the court in their concern for the witness' constitutional rights expressed
the witness' difficulty in proving a link between the compelled testimony and the supposedly independent evidence as the witness' burden of proof. This is not to be confused with the government's burden. The government has the ultimate burden of proof
which never shifts to the witness; however, the witness has a production-burden of
producing evidence that will effectively counteract that of the government. 449 F.2d at
34-35 n.5.
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mal margin of human fallibility. Men working in the same office
or department exchange information without recording carefully
how they obtained certain information; it is often impossible to
remember in retrospect how or when or from whom information
was obtained. .... Moreover, the possibility of subtle inferences
drawn from action or non-action on the part of fellow law enforcement personnel would be difficult if not impossible to prove or
disprove. 69
Hence, the overbreadth of transactional immunity can be justified
on the grounds that: (1) it is an adequate means of ensuring that a witness' compelled testimony is not subsequently used against him; and
(2) the mere possibility of such future use is a danger which the witness
cannot be forced to accept, since the fifth amendment's right of silence
would have negated such a threat. It is this threat, this danger, which
prevents use immunity from being coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege and which makes transactional immunity the preferable
alternative.
The questions involving immunity have been a bone of contention since Counselman, and have continued to divide the Supreme
Court. Justices White and Stewart, concurring in Murphy, stated their
position on immunity as follows:
In [our] view it is possible for a federal prosecution to be based
on untainted evidence after a grant of federal immunity in exchange for testimony in a federal criminal investigation. . . . It
is precisely this possibility of prosecution based on untainted evidence that we must recognize....
•.. [We] believe the State may compel testimony incriminating
under federal law, but the Federal Government may not use such
testimony or its fruits in a federal criminal proceeding. Immunity
must be as broad as, but not harmfully and wastefully broader
70
than, the privilege against self-incrimination.
Justice Stewart, concurring with retired Justice Harlan, in Stevens v.
Marks,71 argued that the sufficiency of the New York use immunity
statute should not be decided before a thorough study of the law,
72
since such a decision might "invalidate one or more federal statutes."
They also questioned the continued validity of Counselman after the
Murphy and Malloy decisions, stating that:
In addition, this Court has recently extended the Fifth Amendment
to the States, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, and abolished the "two
69 400 U.S. at 568 (Brennan J., dissenting).
70 378 U.S. at 106-07 (White J., concurring).
71
72

383 U.S. 234 (1966).
Id. at 249-50.
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sovereignties" rule, Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52,
so that an expansive reading of the privilege could have a far more
73
serious impact than was true in the days of Counselman.
Three Justices, Brennan, Douglas and Marshall, in their dissenting
opinion in Piccirillov. New York, 74 confidently supported transactional
immunity as the "minimal constitutional guarantee." Justice Brennan,
speaking for the three, stated:
I believe that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against selfincrimination requires that any jurisdiction that compels a man
to incriminate himself grant him absolute immunity under its
laws from prosecution for any transaction revealed in that testimony. Such transactional immunity, in my view, steers a well-conceived middle path between, on the one hand, a position that no
immunity statute can supplant the constitutional privilege and,
on the other, a position that affords the individual the altogether
too narrow protection of use immunity as applied to the very
government that has compelled him to incriminate himself ...
Mere use immunity which protects the individual only against
the actual use of his compelled testimony and its fruits, satisfies
neither the language of the Constitution itself nor the values, purposes, and policies that the privilege was historically designed to
serve and that it must serve in a free country. Finally, this Court's
decisions in the course of the past century have consistently read
the Constitution as requiring no more, but no less, than transac75
tional immunity.
Justice Douglas' position on the issue can be inferred from his dissenting opinion in Ullman v. United States,76 in which he stated:
My view is that the Framers put it beyond the power of Congress to
compel anyone to confess his crimes ....

The Framers, therefore,

created the federally protected right of silence and decreed that
the law could not be used to pry open one's lips and make him a
77
witness against himself.
Justice Douglas would possibly find that even a grant of transactional immunity by the questioning jurisdiction, which leaves the witness subject to prosecution in other jurisdictions on the basis of independent evidence, is not coextensive with the fifth amendment privilege
and therefore unconstitutional. 78 It would appear, however, that Jus73
74
75
76
77
78

Id. at 250. See In re Zicarelli, 55 N.J. 249, 266-67, 261 A.2d 129, 138 (1970).
400 U.S. 548 (1971).
Id. at 562-63 (footnote omitted).
350 U.S. 422 (1956).
Id. at 445-46 (Douglas, J., with whom Black, J. concurs, dissenting).
Id. at 445-46, 449, 454.
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tices White, Brennan and Marshall would uphold the granting of transactional immunity thus leaving the witness open to prosecution in other
jurisdictions. Therefore, while transactional immunity might be constitutionally required of the questioning sovereign, there might well
79
be no such necessity regarding inter-jurisdictional immunity.

The Supreme Court, by granting certiorari8 0 in the Stewart case,
is now in the position to eliminate the plethora of contradictory inferences and deductions encompassing the Counselman and Murphy decisions. Hopefully, the Court will refuse to accept the semantic equality
of use immunity and the privilege of silence, and will not be content
to merely define the government's burden of proof with respect to the
untaintedness of its evidence. If the Court acknowledges that it is unable to ensure that the questioning jurisdiction will not use the witness'
coerced words in any manner, then it is possible for the Court to conclude that the fifth amendment demands the protection afforded by a
grant of transactional immunity, 'at least on the intra-jurisdictional
level.
It is also possible that the Court will reevaluate the Murphy requirement of use immunity between jurisdictions. In noting probable
jurisdiction in In re Zicarelli,s ' the Court concerned itself with the
following question:
Whether the immunity statute . . . can supplant the Fifth

Amendment privilege when it fails to provide immunity against
to an individual who has real fear
foreign prosecution, with respect
of such foreign prosecution?8 2
Whatever the Court ultimately decides, its decision will undoubtedly aid in measuring the circumference of the fifth amendment's protective umbrella, as embodied in a constitutional grant of immunity.
Linda A. Palazzolo
79 400 U.S. at 562-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting, with Marshall, J., joining); Murphy
v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. at 92, 106-07 (White, J., concurring).
80 Kastigar v. United States, 402 U.S. 971 (1971) (sub noma.).

81 401 U.S. 933 (1971).
82 Id.

